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Optimal Portfolio Choice over the Life-Cycle with  
Flexible Work, Endogenous Retirement, and Lifetime Payouts 
 
Previous research on portfolio choice and retirement patterns has evolved from three 
sources. First, the finance literature has investigated how investors save and allocate their 
portfolios across available capital market assets, typically safe bonds and risky stocks.1 Yet 
most of these studies are silent on the links between labor supply and investment behavior. 
Second, a large public finance literature has explored how older people alter their work 
patterns in response to public pension system retirement incentives, but that research devotes 
little attention to saving and portfolio allocation patterns.2 And third, the longevity risk 
literature has examined how annuity payout products can help protect against outliving one’s 
income,3 but it has not yet explored how flexible labor supply might shape portfolio allocation 
and location decisions. The present paper seeks to unify these three strands in a model which 
integrates the decisionmaking process of a consumer seeking to optimally select her 
consumption, saving, investment patterns, work hours, and retirement age in a life-cycle 
context, where she has access to both capital market (stocks and bonds) and life annuities. 
We contribute to the finance and pension literature by making the consumer’s 
work/retirement decisions endogenous, as she is able to adjust both employment hours during 
her work-life as well as her retirement date, against the backdrop of an earnings-related 
benefit structure similar to the US Social Security system. We also distinguish between the 
date when the worker retires from her full-time job, and the date when she claims social 
security benefits. We also add value to the public finance literature by making investment and 
annuitization decisions endogenous to the lifecycle work and retirement choice. From the 
individual’s perspective, we show how stochastic equity returns, uninsurable labor income 
shocks, and uncertain lifetimes help shape investment portfolio patterns and consumption 
paths both before and after retirement. 
This is not the first analysis that makes labor supply endogenous over the life-cycle in 
an investment context,4 but we extend prior research by integrating flexible work hours and 
retirement ages with uncertain mortality and uninsurable labor income paths to show how 
these influence consumption, saving, and portfolio choice paths. Using a realistically 
calibrated life-cycle model, we derive optimal work and retirement behavior as well as 
                                                          
1 See for instance the seminal piece by Merton (1969). 
2 For example, see Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). 
3 The classic reference is Yaari (1965). 
4 See for instance Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992); Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008); and 
Polkovnichenko (2007).  
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consumption and investment patterns over stocks, bonds, and payout annuities, given a 
realistic old-age pension structure. For the young, we show that having flexible work hours 
and claiming ages are consistent with substantial welfare gains of 8%. The additional utility 
gain from having access to traditional annuities paying fixed benefits is small, but lifetime 
utility is greatly enhanced (by 10%) if they can purchase investment-linked payout annuities. 
We also extend the portfolio choice literature by making work patterns more flexible. 
Many studies have previously assumed that investors construct their portfolios independent of 
labor market influences, though a few do allow uninsurable labor income risk to shape 
household optimal consumption and investment decisions.5 The latter illustrate that portfolio 
equity shares optimally fall with age due to the bond-like path of labor market earnings, 
though they still maintain the exogeneity of labor supply. A handful of authors has embedded 
flexible work hours into a continuous time portfolio choice model, yet they assume 
unrealistically that workers can fully insure labor income risk in the capital market (i.e. that 
wages are perfectly correlated with a set of traded risky securities).6 A recent paper by Gomes, 
Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) endogenizes work hours over the life-cycle in a realistically 
calibrated portfolio choice discrete time model, yet the authors require mandatory retirement 
at a pre-specified age (so the worker will consume full leisure and claim Social Security 
benefits at the same time). Disallowing control over one’s retirement age is problematic since 
working longer can be a key way that workers may react to capital and labor market shocks.7 
In addition, deciding when to retire and claim one’s Social Security benefits is one of the most 
important financial decisions that workers can make. Particularly in the current financial bear 
market, households might be able to hedge adverse capital market developments by increasing 
their work effort and/or working longer. Our contribution is to show how surprises in labor 
income and capital markets interact to influence work, consumption, and financial holdings in 
complex ways. When workers can adjust work hours and retirement flexibly and also have 
access to lifetime payout markets, negative labor market shocks and high stock returns can be 
offset by working less while young, buying more annuities, and claiming Social Security 
benefits early.   
A large literature in the public finance arena explores how consumption, saving, and 
work patterns respond to Social Security benefit incentives, but those studies do not devote 
                                                          
5 See for instance Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007), Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), 
Heaton and Lucas (1997) and Viceira (2001). 
6 See for instance Bodie, Detemple, Otruba, and Walter (2004), Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992), and Fahri 
and Panageas (2007). 
7 See for instance Coile and Levine (2010), Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010), and Mitchell and Fields 
(1984). 
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much attention to portfolio investment behavior. Instead, that research focuses carefully on 
the way in which Social Security benefits depend on and/or influence retirement behavior. For 
instance, Gruber and Wise (2004) and Laitner (2003) analyze the effects of Social Security 
taxes and benefits on retirement ages, and Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) offer an empirical 
analysis of retirement patterns.8 Aguiar and Hurst (2005) and Battistin, Brugiavini, and Weber 
(2009) focus on sharp changes in consumption around the retirement date, but they do not 
integrate the portfolio choice problem in their analysis. Low (2005) and French (2005) also 
investigate optimal consumption, saving, and labor supply patterns with stochastic and 
unspanned wages, but they abstract from the portfolio allocation problem.  
   A last research strand on which we build analyzes the impact of longevity risk on life-
cycle portfolio management. This analysis demonstrates how investors chose between stocks, 
bonds, and payout annuities, so as to optimize their saving and consumption patterns during 
retirement.9 Two recent studies integrate life annuities into a realistically calibrated portfolio 
choice model (uninsurable labor income, uncertain life time, stochastic capital markets, and 
borrowing constraints) over the full life-cycle, but they do not endogenize the work hours or 
the retirement decision.10 They demonstrate that annuities are valuable in that they offer 
investors the opportunity to give up liquidity in exchange for a survival-contingent premium 
known as the ‘survival credit’. 
 What remains to be done is to develop a model with uninsurable labor income, 
uncertainty regarding asset returns and lifetime, endogenous consumption and work hours 
decisions, choice of retirement date, and life annuities in the portfolio choice set. We 
undertake this task and compare resultant optimal behaviors from this realistically-calibrated 
model with several stylized facts. Our base case fits many of the stylized facts well:  we 
obtain two peaks in retirement rates, a hump-shaped pattern of work hours, sizeable 
discontinuities in consumption at retirement, and low annuity take-ups by older households.  
While households therefore appear to do relatively well compared to model outcomes with 
regard to work hours, retirement pattern, and consumption, it appears that they do not allocate 
their financial assets optimally, compared to our model. Our welfare analysis demonstrates 
that improvements in portfolio choice, such as adopting an age-dependent equity exposure 
pattern (instead of the widely-used 60:40 constant equity/bond mix) and purchasing 
investment-linked payout annuities, could increase lifetime utility by quite substantial 
                                                          
8 Other studies focus on the empirical analysis of retirement patterns; see Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva 
(2000) and Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2008). 
9 See Milevsky, Moore, and Young (2006), Milevsky and Young (2007); Yogo (2009); and Inkmann, Lopes, and 
Michaelidis (2011); a literature review is provided by Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008).   
10 See Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009) and Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos (2008). 
4 
 
 
amounts. Nevertheless these are less important than having flexibility over work hours and 
retirement decisions. 
 
1. The Consumer’s Life-Cycle Problem 
1.1 Preferences 
 We employ a discrete time model  1,...,0  Tt  for a representative individual, where 
t refers to the adult’s age (computed as actual age minus 19 assuming the relevant lifespan 
starts at age 20). The individual has an uncertain lifespan and may live for a maximum of T 
years (indexed from 1 to T). Preferences in each period are characterized by an iso-eleastic 
and time-separable power utility function 

 11 )(1),( ttttt LCLCu
 
defined over a 
composite good consisting of consumption to date Ct and time devoted to leisure Lt. The 
individual’s work effort is measured as a fraction of the total available time (1 - Lt), i.e. full 
leisure is normalized equal to one. The relative importance of leisure and consumption is 
governed by a modified Cobb-Douglas function, which ensures that the elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to one.11 The parameter α > 0 governs 
individual preferences for leisure relative to consumption: the lower is α, the fewer work 
hours the individual is willing to supply in order to boost consumption. The curvature 
parameter displays the coefficient of relative risk aversion for consumption. 
 The recursive definition of the corresponding value function is given by:  
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tp  denotes the 
(subjective) probability of surviving to period t + 1, given the individual is alive at t. In the 
last period, sTp  is equal to zero. The discount factor β < 1 represents the individual’s 
subjective time preference. Qt denotes bequeathed wealth and the strength of the bequest 
motive is controlled by the parameter b. In our base case, we abstract from bequest motives 
and set b to zero, while in sensitivity analysis, we allow it to be positive. 12 
                                                          
11 Such a formulation is in line with the preference requirements of a balanced growth model; see King, Plosser, 
and Rebelo (1988). As noted by Cooley and Prescott (1995), a unitary elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure is consistent with evidence that, despite average real wage having risen steadily in the 
US post WWII period, there has been no apparent trend in hours worked per household. Gomes, Kotlikoff, and 
Viceira (2008) use the same preference formulation although their analysis is silent on retirement, claiming, and 
annuitization decisions.  
12 Empirical evidence regarding the strength of the bequest motive is mixed. Hurd (1989) estimates an almost-
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1.2 Financial Assets  
 The individual may access financial markets by investing in three different asset 
classes: riskless bonds, risky stocks, and illiquid payout life annuities. The real bond gross 
return is denoted by Rf and constant over time. The real gross risky stock return at time t is 
labeled Rt and evolves according to a geometric random walk with drift. This implies that the 
log-returns for stocks ln(Rt) ~ N(µs, σs) are serially independent and identically normally 
distributed with mean µs and standard deviation σs. The return on assets is taxed according to 
a proportional rate c applied to all asset income.13   
 We also include payout life annuities in the investment opportunity set. These are 
financial contracts primarily offered by life insurance companies or pension funds which, in 
exchange for an initial non-refundable premium, pay a pre-specified benefit income stream as 
long as the annuitant is alive. In the case of a fixed life annuity, currently the dominant 
product in the payout annuity marketplace, the survival-contingent benefits are specified for 
certain at the beginning of the payout period.  By contrast, payments from an investment-
linked or variable annuity begin with an initial payment, and subsequent benefits are set 
according to an updating rule which reflects the return of an underlying portfolio which can 
include equities, bonds, or both. Since the annuity contract entitles the individual to a lifelong 
income stream, it allows the annuitant to transfer the longevity risk (i.e. the risk of outliving 
her assets) to the insurance company and earn the survival credit. The insurer can hedge its 
liabilities by pooling longevity risk across (a sufficiently large) group of annuitants. Surviving 
annuitants receive the reserved funds of other pool members who die. In this sense, the life 
annuity is a collective (or pooled) product and the redistribution of funds among surviving 
members can generate an extra return, referred to as the survival credit, which will exceed the 
return of capital market assets with similar risk profile. Nevertheless, the appeal of longevity 
risk protection provided by annuity contracts comes at the expense of foregone liquidity, since 
usually these do not provide a bequest and cannot be refunded to the purchaser. 
 The premium charged by the insurer for such a lifelong income stream may be derived 
according to the actuarial principle of equivalence:  
   
T
ts
ts
a
tt AIR
stp
PA
1
11
),(
)1(  .    (2) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
zero intentional bequest preference and thus concludes that most households have only accidental bequests; on 
the other hand, Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) report that many older persons indicate they have a 
significant bequest motive. 
13 We do not consider tax-deferred saving accounts examined by Amromin (2003) since including these would 
require another state variable. 
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Here δ is an expense or loading factor charged by the insurance company to cover 
administrative costs, AIR is the Assumed Interest Rate, and Pt is the first payout after the 
annuity is purchased. Also  1),( s
t
a
t
a pstp  is the cumulative conditional survival probability 
that an individual age 19+t will survive to age 19+s. The single-period survival probabilities 
a
tp  are specified by a mortality table used by the insurance company which we permit to 
differ from the individual's subjective survival probabilities stp . Accordingly, we can model 
asymmetric mortality beliefs and address the problem of adverse selection in the private 
annuity market. An updating rule relates the annuity payouts Pt+1 in future periods to the 
previous payout Pt and the realized return atR 1  relative to the AIR of the underlying portfolio 
backing the annuity. Formally, the equation describing the evolution of future payouts may be 
recursively written as: 
 AIR
RP
P
a
tt
t 

 1
1
1
. 
(3) 
Here  ftatfat RRRR   11   is the growth rate of the underlying portfolio consisting of 
stocks and bonds, whereby at  is the stock fraction chosen inside the variable annuity at time 
t. This equation highlights that the annuity payment rises when atR 1  > 1+ AIR; it falls when 
a
tR 1 < 1+ AIR; and it is constant when 
a
tR 1 = 1+AIR.
14  The classic fixed life annuity is a 
special case, whereby the portfolio allocation inside the annuity is fully invested in bonds (i.e. 
a
t = 0) and the AIR is set equal to the riskless interest rate (i.e. 1 + AIR = Rf).  
1.3 Labor Income and Social Security Benefits in Retirement 
 Our model accounts for flexible hours during the work-life and a flexible age at which 
the worker can claim Social Security benefits. Our parameters are generally similar to those 
in the US Social Security system; that is, the worker can claim Social Security retirement 
benefits anytime between the ‘early’ claiming age (ECA; set here to age 62) and the ‘latest’ 
claiming age (LCA; set here to age 70). The individual receives a real wage when working 
and decides what fraction of her available time to devote to the job. In turn, her labor supply 
decision ( tL1 ) then influences gross labor earnings. We allow workers to select from a 
menu of alternative work hour levels, since most people do not have fully flexible schedules. 
Labor earnings are reduced by a given fraction of expenditures related to housing ht. Also 
                                                          
14 A more detailed discussion of how the AIR influences payout profiles appears in Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, 
and Stamos (2010). 
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individuals must pay taxes on their labor earnings (after housing expenditures) according to 
the proportional rate l . Thus disposable yearly labor earnings during the work life (t < τ,
]70,...,63,62[ ) are given by: 
     
ttt
ttt
l
tt
NEE
UEtwLhY
1
,exp11)1(

 
    (4) 
Here  tw  is a deterministic function of wage rates with respect to age, allowing us to 
calibrate the empirically observed hump-shaped earnings profile. tE  is a permanent labor 
earnings component with innovation tN , and tU  reflects a transitory shock uncorrelated with 
tN . The logarithms of both tN  and tU  are assumed to be serially independent and 
identically normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation of N  and U . The 
correlation between the innovation to the permanent component of the wage rate tN  and the 
stock return Rt is denoted by n. In our discrete time model, τ is the endogenous age at which 
the individual claims Social Security retirement benefits. This age is treated as both a 
decision variable as well as a state variable, with nine possible values from age 62 to 70.  
 After claiming, the household receives lifelong benefits from Social Security (after 
taxes and housing costs) defined as follows: 
    FCArtt FYhY ,1)1(  ,  (5) 
where          FCAFCAFCA IFCAgIFCAgF     21, expexp . The Social Security 
replacement rate ζ is based on lifetime average earnings, and the age when the worker can 
claim full benefits is denoted by FCA.15 The average lifetime earnings level is approximated 
by
 
   KK
t
EKtwLY 

  


/exp)1(
1
, whereby K denotes the period when the individual attains 
her full claiming age and 
 L1  stands for the average fraction of available time worked 
during her work-life.16 Social Security benefits are taxed at rate r , which might be lower 
than the wage tax rate to account for progressive taxation. I is an indicator function which 
identifies whether the individual claims at, later, or prior to the FCA. The factor FCAF ,  
                                                          
15 We use the term Full Claiming Age (FCA) since we distinguish retirement from claiming decisions. This 
differs from the terminology used by the US Social Security Administration, who employs the term Full 
Retirement Age (FRA).  
16 This is a reasonable approximation of the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) concept used by the US 
Social Security Administration which uses an average of the worker’s highest 35 years of earnings to calculate 
benefits. Our formulation saves a state variable yet takes into account the fact that people with relatively high 
average career earnings will perceive a lower replacement rate from Social Security benefits (i.e., benefits from 
Social Security benefits as a percent of the worker’s average salary) compared to lower earners.  
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depends on the FCA, the endogenous claiming age , the reduction rate g1, and the delayed 
claiming credit rate g2 (here 21 g and g are positive constants). If the worker claims prior to the 
FCA, FCAF , functions as an actuarial reduction factor permanently reducing her benefit 
payments. On the other hand, if she claims later than the FCA, her lifelong benefits are 
increased by the delayed retirement credit factor FCAF , .
17  In our model, we assume that 
people claim retirement benefits and move to full leisure at the same age, as Coile, Diamond, 
Gruber, and Jousten (2002) indicate that this is, in fact, what most people actually do. 
Additionally, the work-leaving decision is permitted to differ from the date of claiming Social 
Security benefits. We denote individuals as retired if they leave their full-time jobs. Workers 
can retire from full-time jobs without claiming Social Security benefits as long as they live on 
saving and part-time jobs. 
 From the individual’s viewpoint, the Social Security system is analogous to a 
mandatory defined benefit pension scheme with lifelong annuity payments. In this way, 
private life annuities and Social Security benefits are comparable since both provide lifelong 
income; moreover individuals can ‘roll their own’ personal defined benefit scheme by 
resorting to the private life annuity market.  
 
1.4 Wealth Transition and Optimization 
 The individual decides each period how to allocate her available cash on hand W to 
consumption Ct and liquid saving compromised by bonds Bt and stocks St, and the amount At 
of newly-purchased life annuities. The budget constraint becomes: 
ttttt CABSW  . (6) 
With this investment and consumption strategy, next period’s wealth Wt+1 consists of after-tax 
financial wealth (including stocks and bonds), annuity payments, labor income during the 
work-life and Social Security benefits after claiming. This is given by: 
    11111 )()()(   ttttftsttcftsttt YPSBRBRSRBRSW   (7) 
where Pt+1 is the sum of annuity payments received from all previously-purchased annuities 
Here Yt+1, which below we call labor income, is defined in equations (4) and (5), i.e. net labor 
earnings prior to claiming, and Social Security benefits after claiming. If the individual dies, 
her estate is given by her remaining liquid savings in bonds and stocks: 
  .)()()( 111 ttftsttcftsttt SBRBRSRBRSQ     
The recursive evolution equation for the sum of after-tax payouts from all previous annuities 
                                                          
17 Other details of the Social Security rules are not considered here such as the earnings test for those who still 
work and hence have labor income after claiming Social Security benefits. 
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purchased can be written as:18 
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 The individual’s optimization problem is now to maximize the utility in (1) with 
respect to the appropriate asset allocation between bonds, stocks, and life annuities (including 
the optimal weight to stocks within the annuity), consumption/saving, leisure, and the 
decision when to claim Social Security benefits: 
  t
ABSLC
V
a
tttttt
max
,,,,,,   (9) 
We rule out short-selling in stocks and bonds (inside and outside the annuity) and preclude 
the household from borrowing against future labor, pension, and annuity income by imposing 
the non-negativity restrictions:   .0,,1,,  ttatatt BSA    
  
 There are five state variables in the model: cash on hand Wt, annuity payouts from 
previously purchased annuities Pt, permanent labor earnings tE , the retirement age τ, and age 
t. To reduce the problem by one state variable, we normalize the continuous state variables 
cash on hand and annuity payouts with the permanent labor earnings component. Next we 
discretize the (normalized) continuous state variables and solve the optimization problem by 
backward induction in a four-dimensional state space. For computations, we use a 
)(42)(30)(40 tPW   grid space before and a )(9)(39)(30)(40  tPW  after ECA. For each 
grid point we evaluate the value functions using Gaussian quadrature integration and cubic-
spline interpolation. 
 
1.5 Model Calibration 
 The individual’s lifespan is modeled from age 20 to 100 (T = 81). In our base case, 
preference parameters are set to standard values in the life-cycle literature, namely a 
coefficient of relative risk aversion of ρ = 5 and a time discount factor of β = 0.97.19 The one-
period survival rate stp  which enters into the utility function is calculated using the US 1996 
                                                          
18 Here the annuities are held in a non-tax qualified account and interest earnings are taxed as capital gains at a 
rate below the tax rate on labor earnings but higher than the Social Security tax rate (i.e. r < c < l). This is an 
approximation to the exclusion ratio approach implemented by the US tax authority adopted for computational 
simplicity; for more detail on annuity taxation see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (1999) and 
Milevsky (2006).  
19Samwick (1998) reports that median time preference rates for US households are between 3 and %, which 
implies a discount factor β of between 0.971 and 0.962. Therefore, β = 0.97 is consistent with Samwick’s (1998) 
empirical finding.  
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population 2000 table for females. We set the leisure preference parameter  equal to 1.3 
which is higher than 0.9 used by Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008). Yet, by doing so, the 
optimal behaviors resulting from our model, such as retirement behavior, consumption 
profiles and work hours, fit the empirical findings well. Later, in the sensitivity analysis, we 
vary both the utility parameters for risk aversion and leisure. 
 The analysis also sets the mean real equity log-return at µs = 3.01% and the 
corresponding volatility parameter σs = 19.34%, equivalent to a yearly expected gross real 
return of 1.05 and standard deviation of 20.5%; the assumed real riskless rate Rf is 1.02. While 
the equity risk premium of 3% is one percentage point lower than the value typically used in 
other life-cycle studies (e.g., Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005), we believe that this lower 
value is a more reasonable expectation for the future after the recent financial crisis.20 (In 
sensitivity analysis, we also consider a case with a higher equity risk premium.)  
 The calibration of the wage rate process follows Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 
(2008), reflective of middle-income households. Here a deterministic age-dependent 
component21 is combined with permanent and transitory wage rate shocks using standard 
deviations equal to N 10.95% and U 13.89% (from Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout  
2005). The correlation between stock returns and permanent earnings shocks n is set in the 
base case to zero, consistent with Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). Returns on assets are 
assumed to be taxed at 20%; labor earnings are taxed at 30% following Gomes, Kotlikoff, and 
Viceira (2008). Housing-related expenditures are modeled as in Gomes and Michaelides 
(2005). 
 We assume that the worker has an available time of 100 waking hours per week and 
has flexibility to choose her level of work intensity. There are seven job types: 60, 50, 40, 30, 
20, 10, and 0 work-hours per week, implying (1 - Lt) [0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0]. The 
average work effort 
 L1  used to calculate Social Security benefits is equal to 0.4, which is 
in line with an average lifetime work effort of 40 hours per week. This corresponds with the 
particular average work hours of a high school graduate reported by American Time Use 
Survey (US Department of Labor, 2010). The Social Security benefit structure is similar to 
that in effect in the United States. The benefit replacement rate ζ is set to 0.52 as per Mitchell 
and Phillips (2006); the actuarial reduction rate for claiming early old age benefits is 
                                                          
20As per the annual returns for the value-weighted stock market index portfolio for US-stocks and bonds with a 
duration of one year (provided by CRSP), we calculate  the annual equity risk premium for the postwar period 
1950-2008 and for the period 1950-2004; the difference is -0,86%, which corresponds to our assumption. 
21More precisely, the earnings function reported in Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2006) equation (9) with 
parameter =0 is used, which results for middle-income workers w(age)=exp(4.47+0.033*age–0.00067*age2); 
this produces a hump-shaped pattern for wage rates. 
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0713.01 g  and the crediting rate for claiming delayed benefits is g2 = 0.077 as in 
Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva (2000). Workers can claim Social Security benefits 
between age 62 and 70, whereby the FCA is set to 65. Social Security benefits are taxed at a 
rate of 15% as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008).  
 To price the life annuities, the assumed interest rate AIR is set to 2%, the expense 
loading factor δ is 2.38% (in line with industry leaders such as Vanguard), and we use 
conditional survival probabilities atp from the US 1996 female annuitant 2000 mortality table 
to account for potential adverse selection in the voluntary annuity market. In our base case we 
assume that the worker only has access to life annuities with fixed payouts. Later on, for the 
welfare analysis, we also take the investment-linked payout annuities into account. 
 
2. Baseline Results 
In what follows, we present the results for our base case where the individual can elect 
retirement age, work/leisure intensity, the level of consumption/savings and the portfolio 
allocation across stocks, bonds, and fixed life annuities. To do so, we use the optimal 
feedback controls obtained from the numerical optimization model and compute expectations 
using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations. In Section 2.1 we discuss patterns of expected optimal 
consumption, labor income, and work hours. Section 2.2 analyzes the worker’s portfolio 
choice. Section 2.3 depicts retirement behavior, optimal Social Security claiming ages, and 
consumption changes at retirement. We conclude this section by analyzing the heterogeneous 
interactions between exogenously-realized labor and capital market outcomes, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, behaviors including consumption, saving, work effort, and retirement.  
 
2.1 Consumption, Saving and Work Hours Profiles 
 Figure 1A traces paths for average consumption, labor income after tax and housing 
expenditures, payment from private life annuities, and liquid saving/wealth patterns by age, as 
well as new annuity purchases. In addition, the function for leisure and consumption which 
enters utility is also plotted. All values are normalized by the worker’s first-year labor income. 
Panel 1B displays the pattern of average work hours for different age groups, as well as the 
distribution of job types. We classify the job types by work intensity into three categories: 
overtime work (more than 40 work hours per week); full-time work (40, 30 hours per week); 
part-time work and non-job respectively (less than 30 hours per week). 
Figure 1 here  
Panel 1A shows that in the first five years of the life-cycle, net labor income tracks 
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consumption closely, and only a small amount of savings is accumulated. This is consistent 
with the model’s assumption that agents are liquidity constraint and cannot increase 
consumption through borrowing against future labor income. Since wage rates are low early 
in life, younger workers have little incentive to increase labor earnings through overtime 
work.  
From the age of 25 until the age of 45, households substantially increase their saving. 
The expected amount of liquid assets peaks at the age of 52, where it amounts to 
approximately nine times first-year labor income. Average labor income follows a hump-
shaped pattern from age 20 until age 65 and reaches its highest level at around age 45. After 
that people gradually receive less labor income until age 65, after which point the labor 
income stream “recovers” and displays a V-shaped pattern. This differs from other life-cycle 
studies such as Campbell and Viceira (2001) and Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), which 
do not report the recovery but rather show a substantial drop of labor income at the exogenous 
retirement age (usually defined as age 65).  
The reason for this V-shaped pattern of labor income has to do with the interaction 
between endogenous work effort and flexibility in claiming Social Security benefits. Figure 
1B shows that, after age 25 when wage rates are growing, households increase their work 
hours and many of them work overtime. This results in rising labor income. For the 30-34 age 
group, households average 48 hours at work and 80% work overtime. Later, they gradually 
curtail labor effort and fewer households work overtime. In middle age, the decreasing work 
hours are compensated by still-growing wage rates, i.e. net average labor income is relative 
stable and high during this time. After that, around age 50, households start to retire from full 
time jobs and sharply decrease average work hours. In the age group 60-64, average work 
effort is about 27 hours per week, and 35% of households work part-time. In addition, as we 
discuss in more detail in the next section, many households do not claim their Social Security 
benefits early but instead they wait until age 65 to avoid reductions for claiming early 
retirement benefits. Hence during the early 60s, due to low work effort and low wage rates, 
labor income is relatively low. From age 65 on, an increasing number of workers claims 
Social Security benefits calculated based on full-time work and therefore they are higher than 
the last labor income stream from part-time work. Again, this helps drive the V-shaped pattern 
of labor income. 
Turning to liquid wealth, Figure 1A shows that from their mid-50s, households start to 
run down their liquid wealth to support consumption which grows until the mid-60s. 
Especially between ages 60 and 70, many households who retire from full-time work and 
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delay claiming Social Security benefits, financing most of their consumption by withdrawing 
from their liquid saving. For example, at age 60, the mean liquid wealth is about 6.9 of first-
year labor income and only 1.1 at age 70. Compared with the peak of assets at age 52, this is 
an asset-exhaustion of about 24% as of age 60, and 85% until age 70. Besides financing 
consumption, some liquid wealth is used to build up a “second income” from annuity 
purchases to supplement Social Security benefits in retirement. After the age of 80, when 
liquid savings are depleted, the individual relies mainly on Social Security benefits and 
secondarily on annuity payments. 
To capture the empirical pattern of work hours, we use the Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics (PSID) data in 2006. Average work hours are calculated by age for US middle 
income class workers (defined here as yearly earnings between $ 25,000 and $ 100,000). The 
data shows an average work effort (up to age 65) of 39.1 hours per week, close to the 39.4 
hours predicted by the model. In addition, the pattern for work hours clustered by age is also 
hump-shaped with a peak in the mid-thirties as predicted by the model (Appendix B).22 
Accordingly, the model generates a relatively realistic labor supply pattern. Overall, 
individuals who can adjust their work hours profit from working harder early in life and build 
up reasonable asset accumulations, used to enjoy more leisure at older ages, and receive 
delayed credits from Social Security. 
 The consumption profile also shows a hump-shaped pattern. Consumption grows 
during the work-life: early on, growing spending levels are financed by rising labor earnings, 
and later by drawing down accumulated assets. Around age 65, when most households 
increase leisure substantially and start to claim Social Security benefits, consumption drops 
sharply and keeps decreasing thereafter. In other words, older households in retirement are 
more willing to substitute purchased goods for leisure time once this is feasible. 23 Consistent 
with the prediction of the permanent income hypothesis, the expected value of the composite 
good defined over consumption and leisure F = C·L which enters into the utility function 
remains quite smooth over the life-cycle. After the age of 70, when individuals enjoy full 
leisure, their effective rates of time preference become higher (because of increasing 
mortality). Hence the willingness to trade off future for current consumption is reduced, 
which explains why individuals devote all their entire income to consumption late in life. 
 The sharp decline in consumption at retirement is in contrast to other life-cycle studies 
which do not endogenize work hours and retirement flexibility, nor the age at which people 
                                                          
22 Similar results are also reported by Low (2005). 
23 This is in line with empirical evidence regarding pre/post consumption and leisure patterns reported in Aguiar 
and Hurst (2005). 
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can claim their Social Security benefits (e.g. Campbell and Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and 
Maenhout 2005). Their results indicate very smooth consumption patterns between pre- and 
postretirement.24 Yet a large empirical literature documents an important drop in spending at 
retirement, for instance, Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001) for U.S. households, Banks, 
Blundell, and Tanner (1998) for the U.K., and Battistin, Brugiavini, Rettore, and Weber 
(2009) for Italy. This discrepancy between standard life-cycle model predictions and 
empirically observed drops in consumption at retirement has been referred to as the 
‘retirement consumption puzzle’. By contrast in our model, agents endogenously reduce their 
expenditure levels around the time of retirement at a fast pace, suggesting that the so-called 
‘consumption puzzle’ described by many analysts may, in fact, not be a puzzle at all.  More 
details on the retirement behavior and consumption pattern are provided in Section 2.3. 
 
2.2 Portfolio Allocations  
 Next we explore expected household asset allocation patterns by age. The stacked 
portion of the graph in Figure 2 depicts the expected amount invested by age in stocks 
(bottom), bonds (middle), and fixed payout annuities (top), as a multiple of first-year labor 
income. In addition, the figure illustrates the trajectory of the corresponding asset weights, 
reported as a percent of total wealth, defined as liquid holdings in stock and bonds plus the 
present value of annuity payments. 
Figure 2 here 
 The graph indicates that the individual will invest a large fraction of saving in stocks 
along the mean path over the life-cycle. Early in the work-life, stocks are the most important 
form of investment; until the mid-30s, the individual invests 100% in stocks.  This is because 
future labor income can be thought of as a high implicit bond position, so investors will seek 
to diversify their overall portfolios consisting of both human and financial wealth (Campbell, 
Cocco, Gomes, and Mahenhout 1999). By investing in stocks, the worker creates a buffer 
against future labor income shocks. In midlife, when financial wealth is increasing relative to 
expected future labor income the investor shifts the asset allocation from risky stocks toward 
safer bonds. Around the age of 57, the fraction invested in stocks falls to its lowest level, 
approximately 65%. Thereafter, the individual is exposed to declining labor income risk as the 
number of work years remaining falls and the individual becomes eligible to claim Social 
Security benefits. The fraction invested in stocks then increases again, until age 65. Until 
retirement, the fraction invested in stocks is higher than those reported in prior studies that 
                                                          
24 The study by Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) also reports a discontinuity in consumption at retirement 
but provides no further discussion of the magnitude of this drop.  
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rule out endogenous work effort and claiming dates.25 The fact that households may react to 
adverse stock market shocks by delaying retirement and claiming permits them to hedge 
capital market risk. 
 It is interesting that fixed payout annuities do not appear in workers’ optimal 
portfolios until their mid-50s. This is because these are unattractive compared to bonds, due to 
high loadings in pricing and their inherent illiquidity. As individuals are more likely to die at 
older ages, the survival credit rises above the bond rate. As a result, starting around their mid-
50s, investors gradually switch from liquid bonds to fixed annuities. At age 66, the allocation 
to bonds is close to zero, whereas the fraction of total wealth invested in annuities is 25%. 
Thereafter, annuities also start to crowd out stocks to take advantage of the further increasing 
survival credit. Around age 80, almost the entire portfolio of financial wealth is invested in 
fixed annuities which provide a lifelong ‘Social Security-like’ income stream. At that time, 
annuity wealth reaches its maximum and is approximately equal to first-year labor income. 
Yet the resulting payments from these annuity holdings are not large, amounting to only about 
7% of total income26 at age 80. Accordingly, in old age, people are expected to rely mainly on 
Social Security benefits. 
 This pattern of optimal asset allocation to life annuities for older households is in line 
with empirical evidence. For instance, the U.S. Social Security Administration (2010, Table 
10.1) reports that about 11.2% (9.4%) of the income for the 80+ (65+) population results from 
private pensions and annuities. To compare these numbers with the prediction from our 
model, we calculate the average fraction of total income generated by annuities for the 10,000 
simulated households. For households age 80+, the model generates an annuity income of 
11.6% (and 8.4% for those age 65+). The reason for the relatively low annuity income is that 
a mandatory Social Security system with annuity-like old age benefits crowds out the demand 
for additional private life annuities. 
 Optimal asset allocation patterns generated by our model suggest that younger 
investors will hold more risky assets than older investors; for instance, between ages 20-30, 
the average stock fraction rises to 100%, with declines after that. A high and then falling stock 
weight by age is in line with several previous normative studies including Cocco, Gomes, and 
Maenhout (2005) and Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008), and it is also consistent with 
financial planning advice (Malkiel 1996). Nevertheless, this pattern is contrary to much 
empirical evidence. For instance, Gomes and Michaelides (2005) show that the average share 
of financial wealth invested in stocks over the life-cycle is relatively constant, at about 60%, 
                                                          
25 For example, Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008). 
26 Total income is defined as sum of labor income, annuity payments, and asset income.  
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in the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. In this paper, our goal is try to find out how much 
the actual behavior of households differs from their expected behavior described by our 
model, rather than match the empirical findings.27  
    
2.3 Social Security Claiming, Retirement Behavior, and Consumption at Retirement 
 Next we explore when individuals start to retire from full time work and when they 
claim Social Security benefits. We also provide more details about the consumption changes 
around retirement. Using the 10,000 simulated households, Table 1A traces out the fraction of 
households electing to claim Social Security benefits and retire, for each age between 62 and 
70. Here we differentiate between claiming and retirement ages: when a household decides to 
claim the Social Security benefit, it moves to full leisure at the same time. Yet a household 
could retire before claiming Social Security benefits. Following the empirical work by 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) and Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001), we denote 
individuals as retired if they work 20 hours or fewer per week. This allows us to compare the 
model’s results with respect to retirement ages and consumption patterns around retirement 
with empirical evidence in the literature. Moreover, we also show the expected change in (log 
average) consumption at different retirement ages. As in Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg 
(2001), we measure the size of consumption change as the difference in log average spending 
two years after and prior to retirement. 
Table 1 here 
 Panel 1A shows that workers claim Social Security benefits between the ages of 64 
and 68, with a mean age of 66.5. Only 140 out of 10,000 simulated households optimally 
claim before 65; these are the marginal households willing to accept much lower lifelong 
benefits in exchange for early claiming. In fact, the majority of households will wait and 
enjoy the credit for delaying their claiming decision. In contrast, retirement from full-time 
work begins much earlier, at age 62; by age 66, all have retired. On average, retirement occurs 
2.7 years earlier than claiming (age 63.8 versus 66.5). Accordingly, the model generates two 
retirement peaks: the first is at age 62 where one-third of the households retire, and the second 
                                                          
27Future work will explore extensions that can narrow this remaining gap between the theory and this stylized 
fact. A possible explanation for the difference may be lack of financial literacy and inertia (Lusardi and Mitchell 
2007). Other efforts to match the empirically observed asset allocation include Gomes and Michaelides (2005) 
who introduce a fixed entry cost for stock market participation and assume a higher correlation between stock 
returns and labor income. Polkovnichenko (2007) postulate additive habit preferences instead of a standard 
CRRA utility function. Nevertheless, the latter studies focus only on matching the asset allocation fractions, 
while they abstract from other behaviors including consumption change around retirement, work hours, and 
claiming age. Finally, incorporating entry costs and habit preferences would require at least one additional state 
variable, which would greatly increase the computational burden given the already-high numerical dimensions of 
our model. 
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is at age 65 (30.1% retire). This pattern is consistent with Gustman and Steinmeier’s (2005) 
findings using the Health and Retirement Study where they note two retirement spikes: a main 
one at age 62, and a smaller one at age 65. Thus our model does a credible job in replicating at 
least the general pattern of the empirically observed retirement distribution. 
 Panel 1A also shows the change in consumption between the two years prior to and 
after retirement. All retirement groups suffer a negative change in consumption, which is 
much higher for households electing to retire late than for those who retire early (-35% for 
retirees at age 66 versus -5% for retirees at age 62). Panel 1B displays summary statistics for 
the change in (log) average consumption. The expected change is -19% and the median 
decline is -20.3%, with a high standard deviation of 18.9%. In addition, the results show a 
positive correlation of 0.43 between the change in consumption and wealth at retirement 
(liquid saving). Moreover, individuals in the lowest wealth quartiles show a much greater 
consumption drop, of 35%, compared to the 7.5% drop for those in the highest wealth quartile  
 Such a sharp drop in spending at retirement is consistent with empirical studies. 
Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) report for US households a mean change in log 
consumption at retirement of -14% and a standard deviation of 42%, in data from PSID and 
the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Thus our life-cycle model with rational forward-looking 
optimization produces a comparably-sized consumption drop as in the data. In addition, and 
consistent with the prediction of the model presented here, Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg 
(2001) (p. 846) report that “(…) a higher wealth ratio is associated with a smaller decline in 
consumption”. Our model’s results are also in line with the empirical study by Aguir and 
Hurst (2005) which use a rich dataset from the Continuing Survey of Food Intake of 
Individuals allowing them to disentangle consumption from expenditure. They find a decline 
in expenditures for nondurable consumption at retirement by 17% and show that this decline 
is accompanied by a large increase in time spending on food production. While our model 
framework does not permit a detailed analysis of time/consumption patterns as in Aguir and 
Hurst (2005), our general results are in line with their findings. At retirement, households are 
highly willing to substitute consumption expenditures for leisure time. In this sense, we have 
demonstrated that the so-called ‘retirement consumption puzzle’ may actually not be a puzzle 
at all, if leisure preferences, flexibility in work hours, and retirement ages are properly 
integrated in the model. 
  
2.4 Heterogeneous Responses to Shocks  
  Next we illustrate interesting interactions between exogenously-realized labor and 
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capital market outcomes, on the one hand, and, on the other, behaviors including 
consumption, saving, work effort, and retirement. The impact of shocks is examined for the 
scenario where consumers have flexible work hours and access to fixed annuity markets. 
  Figure 3 illustrates average consumption/saving patterns (3A and 3B), wage rates 
(3C), work effort (3D), and average stock returns (3E) computed only for individuals who 
elect to retire at age 62 (3,310 out of 10,000 samples) and age 66 (1,310 out of 10,000 
samples). Generally individuals who retire later are those who experienced a positive 
permanent wage shock early in life as well as a relatively poor stock returns (3C and 3D). 
Higher wage rate paths produce higher Social Security benefits, both directly and via the 
delayed retirement credit. This generates both substitution and wealth effects: higher wages 
make leisure more expensive and hence induce more work, counteracted by the fact that 
higher-paid people have more wealth which prompts greater leisure consumption. For our 
preference formulation, individuals with higher wage rate paths also work more, indicating 
that the substitution effect dominates.28 To compensate for later retirement and high work 
effort when young, households have high consumption levels, build up relatively little 
financial wealth, and show a high drop in consumption at retirement; they buy fewer annuities 
and only later in life (3B). This can be explained by the fact that, because of high labor 
income trajectories, these households expect relatively large Social Security benefits so they 
need not amass much wealth in stocks, bonds, and annuities. At age 66, households decide to 
retire completely from full-time work, enjoy full leisure, and claim the Social Security benefit 
immediately (3D). This induces a positive jump in leisure. Therefore, to keep the 
intertemporal marginal utility of consumption constant, as a reaction to an upside jump in 
leisure, consumption at retirement drops by 35.3% (Table 1A).29 Again, we show that the size 
of consumption drop is positively associated with the level of financial wealth at retirement. 
Figure 3 here 
By contrast, those who experience negative wage shocks early in life tend to work less, 
retire from full-time jobs as early as possible, but then they delay claiming Social Security 
benefits. This is because such individuals compensate for their lower wage rates by taking 
more leisure earlier in life and also electing earlier retirement. Interestingly, households with 
low wage profiles, low work effort, and early retirement, also typically have above-average 
stock market performance (3D). They then can build up relatively higher financial wealth and 
buy more/earlier annuities. Their main retirement income source is then payouts from private 
                                                          
28 A positive relation between wages and expected optimal labor supply is noted by Bodie, Detemple, and 
Rindisbacher (2009) for the same set of preferences. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) also finds out that the wealth 
effects in labor supply are smaller than substitution effects. 
29 See also Battistin, Brugiavini, and Weber (2009). 
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annuities, with less coming from Social Security benefits. Accordingly, high stock market 
returns lead households to retire early. They gradually switch from full-time to part-time 
work. This implies a gradual change in leisure and an appropriately small consumption 
change at retirement (Table 1A; Figure 3D).  
 
3. Sensitivity Analysis 
 The model also allows us to quantify the complex interactions of household optimal 
behavior on work hours, retirement, consumption, and asset allocation decisions. Thus it is of 
interest to assess whether our base case results vary with alternative formulations.  To this 
end, we explore several alternative formulations of key utility parameters, namely risk 
aversion, the value attached to leisure, and the bequest motive. We also examine three other 
variations, namely the expected equity risk premium, the correlation of equity returns with 
labor income, and the age at which full Social Security benefits can be claimed. Of particular 
interest are the effects on work hours, retirement ages, and consumption changes at 
retirement, all summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 5.  In addition, we evaluate the effects on asset 
allocation patterns in Table 4. In all instances, base Case (1) is the point of reference, where 
the worker can elect flexible work hours, an endogenous claiming age, and an endogenous 
retirement age; she also has access to stocks, bonds, and fixed payout annuities. Variants 
include Case (2) which boosts risk aversion to . In Case (3) we make  age-dependent to 
allow the utility of leisure to deteriorate with poorer health at older ages (motivated by 
Buchinsky, Rust, and Benítez-Silva, 2000). The leisure parameter is given by (t)=1.9-
1/(1+t/60), where t is the period. Case (4) reduces the consumer’s leisure preferences to α = 
0.9 as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008). In Case (5) we introduce a bequest motive 
with b = 2. Case (6) incorporates a correlation of 0.2 between stocks returns and permanent 
labor income, and Case (7) increase the equity risk premium to 5%. For our final case (8), we 
increase the age at which full benefits from Social Security can be claimed (FCA=67). 
Tables 2-5 here 
 Preference Parameters: We first explore the impacts of different preference 
parameters on labor supply, retirement, consumption, and investment decisions. Table 2 
displays labor supply patterns where the ‘point of reference’ individual begins working about 
40 hours per week, and in her mid-30’s peaks at just under 50 weekly hours; thereafter her 
hours fall gradually until retirement in the late 60’s. All such persons have retired from full-
time work after age 66 (see Table 3). For the risk-averse individual (Case 2), work hours 
between ages 30-60 are similar to those in the reference case, but they are higher for young 
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workers until age 30 and lower before retirement. This is because greater risk aversion 
increases young workers’ desire to build a buffer stock against uninsurable labor income risk 
(due to a precautionary savings motive). Hence they work more early in life and use their 
higher income to accumulate more wealth. For instance, the average financial wealth for those 
age 20-34 is about twice as large as the base case (2.1 times first-year labor income, instead of 
1.1; Table 2). After age 60, when remaining work years dwindle and exposure to labor income 
risk becomes less important, individuals use their relatively high saving to reduce work hours 
and enjoy more leisure. As shown in Table 3, households with higher risk aversion retire at 
age 63.1 on average, or about 8.5 months earlier than the reference case (age 63.8). Compared 
to the base case, the secondary retirement peak at age 65 reported by previous empirical 
studies no longer is evident.  The mean consumption drop at retirement for the highly risk-
averse individuals is the same as the reference case (Table 4, column 2). Not surprisingly, 
more risk-averse individuals exit equities in favor of bonds and annuities at much younger 
ages (Table 2, column 2).  
 For individuals with a bequest motive (Case 5), the results of work hours, retirement 
ages, and consumption drops are comparable to those in the reference case, showing that 
introducing bequests does not much influence labor supply and retirement behavior. The 
bequest motive does induce older individuals to accumulate more inheritable financial wealth 
in terms of equity and bonds, while the allocation to illiquid life annuities is lower. 
 Changing the leisure parameters does have a more potent impact on labor supply, 
retirement behavior, consumption, and investment decisions. Reducing the leisure parameter 
from 1.3 to 0.9 (Case 4) results in an extraordinarily high level of work effort over the life-
cycle, in that young and middle-age employees are predicted to work at least 50 hours per 
week. Many of them must even be required to retire by age 69 and accept a relatively high 
consumption decline at retirement. Accordingly, this functional form might be most relevant 
to tenured university professors (as noted by Ashenfelter and Card 2002), but not for the 
majority of the population. Asset allocation for this group seems reasonable in that they 
accumulate substantial financial wealth beginning with a high equity allocation and, with age, 
gradually moving into safer investments like bonds and annuities. Yet it must be recalled that 
this intuitively appealing life-cycle investment profile coincides with a very intensive and 
lengthy worklife, a pattern limited to relatively few. 
 The model with an age-dependent utility of leisure parameter (Case 3) also results in 
the young and middle-aged workers taking on very high labor hour commitments (averaging 
50 hours per week to age 40), while their effort drops off as health problems set in. 
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Additionally, they are likely to retire very early, with about half leaving work at age 62. Now, 
however, the second retirement peak at age 65 disappears, in contrast to the empirical results 
reported by Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). Such households who anticipate the age/health-
related importance of leisure in later life save more and invest in less risky portfolios before 
retirement, compared to the base case. Consequently, the higher accumulated assets allow 
them to have a smaller consumption drop at retirement. 
 Capital Market Parameters: Introducing a positive correlation between the shocks to 
permanent labor income and stock market returns has a slightly increasing effect on work 
effort (Case 6). Work hours for all age groups are moderately higher compared to the 
reference case. Retirement from full-time work occurs, on average, half a year later (age 64.4 
versus 63.8). Further, such households accept a greater drop in consumption at retirement (-
24.2% versus -19.1%). This result is driven by the well-known fact that a positive correlation 
between stock and labor market shocks forces households to invest less risky (see Cocco, 
Gomes, Maenhout 2005). The smaller asset base resulting from a safer portfolio provides less 
with which to finance reduced work hours and earlier retirement, and buffer consumption 
declines at retirement. 
 Consistent with that line of argumentation, a higher equity risk premium (Case 7) 
enhances the allocation towards stocks. As a result, expected asset accumulations at the end of 
work-life are higher, allowing the individual to retire earlier (on average at age 63.2 versus 
63.8) and experience a smaller consumption drop (-12.7% versus -19.1%) compared with the 
base case. Overall, the variations of capital market parameters considered here have small 
effects on work hours and retirement behavior, but noticeable impacts on portfolio decisions. 
 Increasing the Full Claiming Age (FCA) for Social Security Benefits: The final 
robustness check is a situation when full benefits from Social Security are only available two 
years later (FCA=67). Such an increase makes the early claiming of Social Security benefits 
more costly for the individual, because of the higher actuarial reduction factor. In this setting, 
work hours for the young and middle-aged workers are similar to those in the reference case, 
but important impacts appear later in life. Individuals work more hours in their 60s, and the 
average retirement age increases to almost age 67. The drop in consumption now averages -
24.5%. Turning to asset allocation, individuals save more in the later part of their working 
lives and reduce their allocation to equities in favor of life annuities. This helps compensate 
for reduced Social Security benefits. 
  
4. Welfare Analysis  
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 Our model shows that household optimal consumption and leisure patterns over the 
life-cycle are powerfully shaped by labor supply flexibility, choice of retirement age, access 
to capital markets, and the availability of longevity risk insurance via life annuities. Moreover, 
our base-case model tracks some important empirical stylized facts, including the two peaks 
observed in retirement ages, the hump-shaped pattern of work hours, a discontinuity in 
consumption at retirement, and low annuity take-ups by older households. Yet the model’s 
normative predictions of high and then decreasing stock fractions for young and middle-aged 
workers differs notably from observed behavior, namely relatively low and constant 
equity/bond mixes. Thus it is of interest to examine the economic importance of having less 
labor market flexibility, market incompleteness, and inertial household financial decision-
making. In addition, our framework allows us to study the welfare implications of recent 
product innovations offered by the retirement finance industry. One such innovation is the 
development of variable (investment-linked) payout annuities which allow the annuitant to 
participate in the equity risk premium. 
 Table 6 quantifies the impact on consumer welfare in two ways: relative utility gains 
based on standard consumption-equivalent variations, and also gains relative to what the 
consumer would be willing to give up as a percent of her first-year labor earnings.30 These 
increases in lifetime utility are computed from the vantage point of a 20-year old. Welfare 
gains are computed for a simple reference case given the lifetime utility level of a consumer 
with fixed work hours and retirement date, and who also lacks access to annuity markets 
(Row A).31 
Table 6 here 
 As noted before, many people can optimize their work effort and consumption as in 
the model. But in the real world, they may fail to optimally allocate their assets and instead 
adopt a simple constant portfolio mix strategy. To better understand these behaviors, and to 
explore the potential impact of this suboptimal investment behavior, we introduce Rows (B) 
and (C).  Relative to the reference case, the worker in Row (B) invests assets using a constant 
60:40 equity/bond investment rule. This suboptimal asset allocation is shown to produce a 
relatively low lifelong utility loss of 0.5% (measured in consumption-equivalent terms), or a 
3.2% loss of first-year labor income. Row (C) depicts an individual who can adapt both her 
work hours and her Social Security claiming age; this additional freedom with respect to  her 
labor market options provides a large lifetime utility gain of 8.2%, or a 61% gain in first-year 
                                                          
30 Computational details appear in the Technical Appendix A. 
31 The consumption-equivalent variable in utility terms is a standard metric; we also present the worker’s first 
year of labor income as a metric for the welfare change as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008).  
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labor income. Comparing Row (B) and (C), we conclude that a highly restrictive labor market 
in terms of fixed work hours and claiming ages is less appealing than having a suboptimal 
asset allocation. This may be one reason why people tend not to pay much attention to their 
asset allocations although they may optimize work hours and claiming ages. 
 Rows (D) and (E) permit flexible hours, endogenous claiming ages, and optimal 
portfolio decisions; we also add payout annuities to the investment opportunity set. In Row 
(D), only fixed annuities are available. Given labor market flexibility, the additional utility 
gains of 0.1% are very low in a world with fixed annuities, as compared one without annuities 
(Row C). This changes, however, if the worker has access to investment-linked payout 
annuities. In this most flexible case, reported in Row (E), lifetime utility rises by 9.6% 
compared to the reference case, or 1.4% more than a world without annuities (Row C). It is 
interesting to note that fixed payout annuities have been virtually the only product available in 
the US until recently, with variable (investment-linked) payout annuities being a recent 
market entrant. Nevertheless, the evident appeal of variable payout products in our model 
implies that these may become more attractive as the population ages. 
 Evidently there is a substantial utility benefit from labor market flexibility in the form 
of adjustable weekly hours of work and claiming ages. By contrast, the utility cost is 
relatively low due to suboptimal investing according to the well-known 60:40 equity-to-bond 
rule. Nevertheless, it is non-negligible, suggesting that it may be attractive to enhance investor 
decision-making by improving financial literacy and by providing more appealing financial 
products. Having access to fixed annuities is also advantageous, but less important than 
variable payout annuities from the vantage point of a labor market entrant. 
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5. Conclusions 
  We integrate the literatures on retirement saving, portfolio choice, and labor supply 
with a model of endogenous life-cycle consumption, saving, work hours, retirement age, and 
investment patterns, where the consumer has access to both the capital market (stocks and 
bonds) and payout annuities. Our model, with realistically calibrated parameters, can track 
key stylized facts like the two peaks in retirement rates, the hump-shaped pattern of work 
hours, and the low annuity take-ups of older households to a reasonable extent. Furthermore, 
by introducing endogenous work hours and claiming dates, we derive optimal consumption 
paths in which consumers are found to endogenously reduce their expenditure levels around 
the time of retirement, suggesting that the so-called ‘consumption puzzle’ described by some 
analysts may, in fact, not be a puzzle at all. 
Our model also shows how individuals can optimally adjust both their financial 
portfolios and their work effort in response to both capital and labor market shocks. Prior 
models have not incorporated this degree of interaction between labor, consumption, capital, 
and annuity markets, yet it proves to make a difference. For example, a positive permanent 
wage rate shock early in life and below-average capital market returns combine to produce 
higher work hours, later retirement, and larger consumption drops at retirement, as well as low 
reliance on annuities. Conversely, a worker lucky enough to earn high equity returns can retire 
early and have much smaller consumption drop at retirement, even if she experiences a 
negative labor market shock; the additional capital income is used to buy annuities to 
supplement her low (earnings-related) Social Security benefits. 
 Moreover, we show that making work hours and claiming dates flexible substantially 
enhances lifetime welfare for the young, while the utility cost of following fixed 60:40 equity-
to-bond rule are small. On the one hand, this could be a reason why many households do not 
devote much attention to managing their investment portfolios, although they do optimize 
their work hours and claiming date. On the other hand, there remains a non-negligible utility 
loss from not optimizing the investment mix, so improving financial literacy and providing 
more favorable financial products would be beneficial. Utility gains from traditional fixed 
annuities are small, but utility is enhanced with investment-linked payout annuities, a recent 
innovation in the retirement finance industry.  
  In sum, combining work, investment, and lifetime payouts can provide better and more 
attractive ways to manage life’s many challenges. Though fixed payout annuities have been 
prevalent in the marketplace to date, we anticipate that investment-linked payout annuities 
will become more popular as Baby Boomers age and Social Security benefits will fail to 
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grow. 
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1A.  Life-Cycle Patterns                                              1B. Work Hours Patterns  
 
Figure 1: Optimal Life-Cycle and Work Hours Patterns: Panel 1A displays expected consumption C, saving in liquid assets S, labor income Y, 
and annuity payments P, all as a multiple of first-year labor earnings over the life-cycle. We also show the Cobb-Douglas function value F = CL. 
In Panel 1B, the blue line displays average work hours per week for different groups from age 20 until 70 (the oldest feasible retirement age) and the 
bars plots the distribution of work hours classified according to: overtime [50, 60 work hours per week], full-time [30, 40 work hours per week], and 
part-time or no work [0, 10, 20 work hours per week]).  
Notes: The household has a moderate level of risk aversion for consumption  of 5, a discount rate  of 0.97, and the leisure preference parameter  
is 1.3. The correlation between stock returns and permanent earnings shocks n is set to zero and the equity risk premium 3%. Fixed payout 
annuities are priced using the US annuitant 2000 mortality table (AIR = 2%, loading factor 1.0238). We use optimal feedback controls obtained from 
the stochastic optimization for a female with a maximum lifespan of age 100; expectations are computed from 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations path 
based on the optimal policies derived by the numerical optimization. 
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Figure 2: Financial Wealth and Asset Allocation Patterns by Age. The Figure depicts 
expected amounts invested in stocks, bonds, and fixed payout annuities (as a multiple of first 
year labor income) and trajectories for the fraction held in liquid stocks, bonds, and fixed 
annuities. Asset weights are reported in percent of total wealth (liquid wealth + present value 
of annuity claims). 
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3A. Life-Cycle Pattern for Individuals                          3B.  Life-Cycle Pattern for Individuals                        
       Retiring at Age 62                                                   Retiring at Age 66  
 
 
3C. Average Wage Rate for Individuals                 3D. Average Weekly Hours for Individuals 
     Retiring at Age 62 (66)                                       Retiring at Age 62 (66)  
         
 
 
            3E. Average Gross Stock Returns for Individuals  
                                             Retiring at Age 62 (66) 
 
Figure 3: Expected Consumption, Work Hours, Wage Rates and Stock Return Patterns 
over the Life-Cycle for Those Who Retire at Age 62 and 66. Notes: See Figure 1. 
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1A. Claiming, Retirement, and Consumption Change by Age  1B. Change of Consumption at Retirement 
 
Table 1: Claiming and Retirement Rates, and Change in Consumption at Retirement. Panel A reports the percent of households retiring from 
full-time jobs (working ≤ 20 hours/week) as well as the percentage of households claiming Social Security benefits (working zero hours) at each age 
from 62 to 70. In addition, Panel A displays for each age group of retirees the difference in log average consumption between the two years after 
and prior to retirement. The change in log average consumption at retirement is defined as in Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001).  Panel B, 
left block, provides summary statistics for consumption change at retirement for all 10,000 simulated lifecycle profiles. The right block of Panel B 
shows the average consumption change at retirement by quartiles of liquid wealth at retirement.  
 
Claiming 
Rate 
Retirement 
Rate 
Expected Change 
in log average 
Consumption 
62 0 33.1 ‐5.0
63 0 8.9 ‐8.7
64 1.4 14.8 ‐15.0
65 13.8 30.1 ‐32.8
66 37.5 13.1 ‐35.3
67 31.4 0 ‐
68 15.9 0 ‐
69 0 0 ‐
70 0 0 ‐
Ave. 66.47 63.81 ‐19.1
 (%) 
Age
Wealth at Retirement Mean
Mean ‐19.1 1. Quartile ‐35.0
Median ‐20.3 2. Quartile ‐21.8
St.Dev. 18.9 3. Quartile ‐12.2
5% Quartile ‐48.1 4. Quartile ‐7.5
95% Quartile 13.2 Correlation 43.0
Full Sample
Change in log average Consumption at Retirement (%)
Subsample
  
33
 
 
Table 2: Work Hours per Week over the Life-Cycle for Alternative Parameters. The Table displays average hours worked per week for eight 
parameter settings. Case (1) is the reference case with a modified Cobb-Douglas (MCD) utility function where leisure preferences are α = 1.3, the 
curvature parameter is ρ = 5, and time preference β = 0.97. The correlation between stock returns and permanent earnings shocks is N = 0 and the 
equity risk premium E(R-Rf) = 0.03. For Case (2), the individual becomes more risk-averse so ρ = 7. In Case (3) we use an age-dependent  to 
allow for a gradual decline in the utility of leisure associated with poorer health at older ages as in Buchinski et al. (2000). The (t) is given by  = 
1.9-1/(1+t/60), where t is the period. Case (4) has  = 0.9, i.e. the investor prefers to have much less leisure time. Case (5) assumes the investor has 
a bequest motive (with b = 2). For Case (6) we assume a correlation of n = 0.2 between labor and capital market shocks. Case (7) takes a higher 
equity premium with E(R-Rf) = 5%. For Case (8), we postpone the FCA (Full Claiming Age) to age 67. Notes: See Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
20‐24
25‐29
30‐34
35‐39
40‐44
45‐49
50‐54
55‐59
60‐64
65‐69
39.9
47.4
47.6
44.9
41.9
40.0
38.6
32.8
27.8
39.9
43.8
46.0
43.4
37.9
33.2
27.2
9.9
37.0
32.4
25.3
3.35.220.9
32.3
25.9
4.42.0
36.4
30.9
23.9
5.3
37.1
31.5
39.8
45.7
47.3
44.8
41.8
39.7
41.2
39.5
37.2
39.9
47.6
48.8
44.5
41.6
40.0
49.3
54.1
56.0
53.9
51.4
49.7
47.5
42.8
36.7
5.2
26.3
32.3
36.9
39.8
E(R‐Rf )  FCA
vary 0.9 2 0.2 0.05 67
39.9 49.3
50.0
50.0
49.5
45.6
40.8
44.7
49.0
46.7
43.7
23.3
Average Work Hours per Week
Age Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base Case ρ α α b φn
(5) (6) (7) (8)
7
45.8
48.0
41.6
44.3
41.0
39.6
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Table 3: Expected Asset Allocation and Liquid Savings (as Multiple of First-Year Labor Income) Patterns for Alternative Parameters. The 
Table shows the stock/bond/annuity fraction and the amount of liquid savings as a multiple of first-year labor income for different age groups, under 
the eight parameter settings described in Table 2.  
7
Stocks %
Bonds %
Annuities %
Liquid Savings
Stocks %
Bonds %
Annuities %
Liquid Savings
Stocks %
Bonds %
Annuities %
Liquid Savings
Stocks %
Bonds %
Annuities %
Liquid Savings
Stocks %
Bonds %
Annuities %
Liquid Savings
94.5 93.7
0.9 1.5 1.0 1.6 2.5 0.4 0.4
5.5 6.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.7 0.0 0.080‐94
3.3 1.2 2.4 2.1 36.5
96.7 98.8 97.6 97.9 30.7
39.8 24.3
1.8 3.3 2.3 3.6 3.3 1.1 2.2
52.9 75.3
0.7 0.0 0.6 1.1 9.1 7.3 0.365‐79
56.0 27.6 45.2 40.5 71.7
43.4 72.4 54.2 58.4 19.2
7.9 9.4 9.1 10.4 8.7 7.1 9.4
4.7 30.5 10.6 16.1 2.8 6.3
25.7 29.2 21.3 31.0 56.4 8.750‐64
69.7 43.8 60.2 62.7 66.1 37.3 89.4
25.6
1.9
0.6 0.0
6.4 8.5 7.9 7.3 6.8 6.1 6.2
47.7 98.0
13.7 37.9 22.4 14.1 15.4 51.7 2.035‐49
86.2 55.0 76.8 83.9 84.5
0.2 7.1 0.8 2.1 0.1
0.0 0.0
1.1 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
85.4 100.0
0.1 7.8 0.6 0.2 0.4 14.6 0.020‐34
99.9 92.2 99.4 99.8 99.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
E(R‐Rf ) 
vary 0.9 2 0.2 0.05
Base Case ρ α α b φn
6.9
(8)
FCA
1.8
0.0
98.2
1.0
Asset Allocation (%) and Liquid Savings
64.6
22.6
12.8
9.2
43.0
0.9
56.1
2.6
67
99.9
0.1
0.0
1.2
84.4
14.1
1.6
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Table 4: Retirement Rates for Alternative Parameters. The Table reports the percent of people retiring at each age from 62 to 70 under the eight 
alternative parameter settings described in Table 2.  
7
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
mean
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 43.0 0 0
6.0
63.2
Base Case ρ b
2
φn
63.8 63.1 63.3 67.5 63.7 64.4
0
0 0 0 29.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 9.6 0 0 0
13.1 0 8.6 3.5 7.9 28.9
10.0
30.1 5.6 18.6 3.4 29.1 24.8 21.5
14.8 39.7 12.8 3.9 13.3 18.2
18.3 47.7
8.9 14.5 10.4 2.9 21.0 9.8 14.8
33.1 40.2 49.5 4.2 28.8
Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.2
E(R‐Rf ) 
0.05
α
vary
α
0.9
3.8
2.5
2.1
2.4
23.6
18.4
47.3
0
66.8
(8)
FCA
67
Retirement Ratio (%)
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Table 5: Expected Change in log Average Consumption at Retirement for Alternative Parameters. The Table reports the percent difference in 
log average consumption for the two years after and prior to retirement for the eight alternative parameter settings described in Table 2.
7
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
mean
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
‐12.7
‐32.5
‐8.7 ‐15.3
‐29.4
‐32.8
‐32.1
‐
‐
‐‐ ‐ ‐ ‐23.6 ‐ ‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐30.6 ‐ ‐
‐ ‐
‐0.2
‐8.9 ‐8.8 ‐7.6 ‐12.6 ‐4.7
(7)
Base Case ρ α α b φn E(R‐Rf ) 
vary
‐5.0 ‐5.6 ‐4.8 ‐6.1 ‐4.7 ‐8.6
0.9 2
(4)
‐19.1 ‐18.8 ‐14.1 ‐24.2 ‐19.0 ‐24.7
‐ ‐26.4 ‐ ‐
‐35.3 ‐ ‐35.5 ‐11.4 ‐33.5 ‐35.7
‐32.8 ‐32.1 ‐10.0 ‐33.2 ‐33.9
‐15.0 ‐31.4 ‐13.9 ‐8.5 ‐28.2 ‐17.1
(5) (6)
Age
(1) (2) (3)
0.2
Expected Change in log Average Consumption (%)
0.05
(8)
FCA
67
‐6.2
‐10.4
‐13.4
‐15.0
‐31.7
‐28.7
‐22.5
‐
‐24.5
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Welfare Analysis. We report utility gains as consumption-equivalent variations 
computed with reference to Row (A) which refers to the lifetime utility level of a consumer at 
age 20 without flexibility in labor market, i.e. fixed 40 hours of work/week, a fixed Social 
Security claiming age of 65, and no access to annuity markets. In Row (B), we rule out 
endogenous asset allocation and assume the portfolio is set at a constant 60:40 stock/bond mix 
over the life-cycle. Compared to Row (A), Rows (C, D, and E ) have complete flexibility in 
labor market and allow the worker to select work hours and claiming ages, but they differ 
with regard to annuity possibilities. In Rows (D and E), we allow the access to annuities; in 
Row D, fixed annuities are available, and in Row E, variable investment-linked annuities are 
available. The last column reports the fraction of the worker’s first year labor income that 
would be exchanged for the additional lifetime flexibility make him indifferent, relative to the 
reference case. Notes: See Figure 1. 
  
(A) Fixed No Reference Reference
(B) Fixed No (60% Stocks) ‐0.5% ‐3.2%
(C) Flexible No 8.2% 61.0%
(D) Flexible Fixed 8.3% 61.1%
(E) Flexible Variable 9.6% 63.4%
Welfare Analysis
5 Cases Relative 
Utility 
Gains
Welfare 
Gain: % of 
1st yr 
Labor 
Labor 
Market
Annuity 
Market
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Appendix A: Calculating the Utility-Constant Equivalent Consumption Stream (CE) 
 
For each case, the expected lifetime utility from consumption and leisure at t=1 is given by: 
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where Ct and Lt are optimized in each model variant. In each case, we calculate the constant 
consumption stream CE for an investor with fixed work hours who claims Social Security 
benefits at age 65 (FCA=65) and who does not have access to annuities (i.e. Row A in Table 
6). This constant consumption stream CE makes her as well-off in expected utility terms at 
age 20 as the leisure and consumption stream that can be financed by the life-cycle strategy. 
CE is defined as follows: 
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Appendix B: Average Work Hours by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and 
Model Prediction 
 
 
This Figure traces average weekly hours worked per week by age from our model in the base 
case (solid line), versus empirical evidence from the 2006 PSID (dashed line). We compute 
the PSID values for middle-income workers (annual income US$ 25,000-100,000); mean 
weekly work hours for these workers are calculated by dividing yearly work hours by 52 
weeks. 
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